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Estates and Trusts Article and the pater-
nity statutes, was intended to provide a 
mechanism to assure that children born 
out of wedlock after their putative 
father's death may obtain a judicial de-
termination of their paternity for pur-
poses of establishing inheritance and 
other rights. [d. at 481,578 A.2d at 766. 
Thus, the court concluded that the cir-
cuit court was empowered under the 
paternity statute to declare whether 
Brown was the father of Leah, despite 
the fact that he had died before the 
paternity action was filed and without 
regard to whether an award of child 
support could be made against his estate. 
Id. at 482, 578 A.2d at 766. Conse-
quently, the court reversed the circuit 
court's judgment and remanded the 
case with directions to conduct further 
proceedings to determine, by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, whether 
Brown was Leah's father. Id. 
Thus, the court significantly expanded 
Maryland's paternity laws, as children 
born out of wedlock may now obtain a 
declaration of paternity even if the 
alleged father's death occurred prior to 
the petition. While the number of fraud-
ulent paternity claims may increase, this 
concern, as the court noted, does not 
outweigh the legitimate purpose of pro-
moting the general welfare and best 
interests of illegitimate children through 
their right to establish paternity. 
- Steven Vinick 
Jones v. Speed: EACH APPOINT-
ME NT AT WHICH A PHYSICIAN 
NEGUGENTLY FAILS TO 
CORRECTLY DIAGNOSE HIS 
PATIENT MAY CONSTITUTE A 
SEPARATE NEGUGENT ACT 
UNDER MARYLAND'S MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE STATUTE OF 
UMITATIONS. 
In the recent decision of jones v. 
speed, 320Md. 249, 577 A.2d64 (1990), 
the court of appeals ruled that Mary-
land's five year statute of limitations 
does not prevent a patient from bringing 
a medical malpractice claim against her 
negligent physician in spite of the fact 
that the initial misdiagnosis occurred 
more .than five years before bringing 
suit. 
In July of 1978, Elizabeth Jones con-
sulted Dr. William Speed about her 
severe headaches. Although Mrs. Jones 
expressed concern that the headaches 
may have been caused by an intracranial 
abnormality, the doctor did not perform 
a Computerized Axial Tomography 
study ( CAT scan) or other diagnostic 
studies. Mrs. Jones continued to see Dr. 
Speed until September 16, 1985. During 
this period she made sixteen visits to the 
doctor, but Dr. Speed never ordered 
diagnostic studies of any kind despite 
her persistent headaches. On February 
13, 1986 she suffered a nocturnal seiz-
ure. A neurologist ordered a CAT scan, 
noted a brain tumor and had it surgically 
removed. Since then, she has been free 
of headaches and related symptoms. On 
July 14, 1986, the Joneses filed suit 
against Dr. Speed for failure to diagnose 
the tumor despite his seven years of 
treatment.ld. at 254, 577 A.2d at 66. 
Mr. and Mrs. Jones first filed their 
claim against Dr. Speed with the Health 
Claims Arbitration Panel.! d. at 252, 577 
A.2d at 65. Dr. Speed moved for sum-
mary judgment claiming that even if he 
had been negligent in failing to diagnose 
Mrs. Jones' brain tumor, the injury oc-
curred upon the plaintiff's first visit to 
him on July 17, 1978, more than eight 
years before the complaint was filed. As 
such, her claim was barred by section 
5-109(a) of the Courts and Judicial Pro-
ceedings Article of the Maryland Code 
which requires that an action be brought 
within "'[fjive years of the time the 
injury was committed,'" or three years 
from the date which the injury was dis-
covered. Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code 
Ann. section 5-109(a)(I), (2) (1989). 
Finding that the injury occurred on 
July 17, 1978, the Chairman of the 
Health Claims Arbitration Panel granted 
the doctor's motion. jones, 320 Md. at 
252,577 A.2d at 65. The Joneses filed a 
notice of rejection of the Chairman's 
order and filed a complaint in the Cir-
cuit Court for Baltimore City. Agreeing 
that the claim was barred by the statute 
of limitations, the circuit court also 
granted Dr. Speed's motion for summary 
judgment. On appeal, the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland granted certiorari before 
the court of special appeals heard the 
case.ld. at 253, 577 A.2d at 65-66. 
In their complaint, the Joneses alleged 
in their first count that Dr. Speed was 
negligent when Mrs. Jones first visited 
him and he failed to order tests which 
would detect her brain tumor. The fol-
lowing counts incorporated the first by 
reference but also stated that similar 
acts of negligence occurred on each of 
Mrs. Jones' subsequent visits. The final 
count was a joint claim for loss of con-
sortium.ld. at 252-53, 577 A.2d at 65. 
According to theJoneses, each time that 
the defendant examined Mrs. Jones and 
failed to order tests which would have 
revealed the tumor, a separate act of 
negligence with its own injury occurred. 
Thus, because many of the appointments 
took place within five years of filing the 
complaint, they constituted negligent 
acts committed within the statute of 
limitations.ld. at 255-56,577 A.2d at 67. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
agreed with the Jones' reasoning and 
held that §5-109(a) did not bar their 
medical malpractice claim by reason of 
the statute of limitations. However, the 
court cautioned that on remand they 
must prove that the defendant commit-
ted a separate act of negligence within 
that five year time frame. Mere proof 
that she continued to suffer because of 
an earlier negligent act would not be 
enough.ld. at 261, 577 A.2d at 70. 
Dr. Speed advanced several attacks 
which failed to undermine the Jones' 
argument. He claimed that accepting 
the plaintiffs' rationale would breath life 
into the "continuous course of treat-
ment rule." [d. at 256, 577 A.2d at 67. 
That rule, the court noted, tolled the 
statute of limitations by delaying the 
accrual date of undiscoverable medical 
malpractice until the termination of 
medical treatment. The rule had been 
explicitly rejected in Hill v. Fitzgerald, 
304 Md. 689, 501 A.2d 27 (1985). 
Under that rule, Mrs. Jones would not 
have been barred from suing as to her 
first appointment because the treatment 
of her headaches continued to well 
within five years of her bringing her suit. 
However, under the court's decision, 
she was only permitted to bring suit as 
to any negligence committed within five 
years of her complaint, making clear that 
the "continuous course of treatment 
rule" remained dead. jones, 320 Md. at 
256-57, 577 A.2d at 67. 
The court also rejected Dr. Speed's 
assertion that accepting the Jones' the-
orywould "frustrate the legislative intent 
to provide absolute protection to health 
care providers for acts of negligence 
occurring more than five years before 
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the bringing of an action." Id. at 257, 
577 A.2d at 68. The court explained that 
the Joneses could only succeed in their 
suit if they could prove that Dr. Speed 
had been negligent within the five years 
prior to filing the complaint. Thus, the 
, doctor could not be held liable for any 
negligence occurring before that period 
and, as such, he was protected to the 
extent that the legislature intended 
under §5-109. Id. at 257, 577 A.2d at 68. 
Finally, Dr. Speed argued that the 
long-standing prohibition against split-
ting a cause of action prevented the 
Joneses from bringing suit. He argued 
that had they brought suit for the initial 
act of negligence occurring on July 17, 
1978, their claim for relief would have 
necessarily included damages resulting 
from all subsequent negligent acts when 
her tumor remained undiscovered. Thus, 
because the Joneses were precluded 
from bringing suit on the initial negli-
gence and the initial negligence was so 
intertwined with the later negligence, 
to allow the Joneses to proceed on the 
later counts was the same as permitting 
them to split their cause of action. Id. at 
257-58, 577 A.2d at 68. 
The court agreed that splitting a cause 
of action is prohibited in order "to pre-
vent multiplicity of litigation and to 
avoid the vexation, costs and expenses 
incident to more than one suit on the 
same cause of action." Ex Parte Carlin, 
212 Md. 526, 532-33, 129 A.2d 827 
(1957) quoted injones, 320 Md. at 258, 
577 A.2d at 68 (1990). The flaw with 
Speed's reasoning, noted the court, was 
that the rules prohibiting splitting a 
cause of action, and application of res 
judicata principles only apply to situa-
tions where the plaintiff has in fact 
brought suit and a final adjudication has 
occurred. jones, 320 Md. at 259, 577 
A.2d at 69. In the Jones' situation the 
court explained that prior adjudication 
addressing the physician's negligence 
had never occurred. As such, the court 
concluded, the Joneses were not pre-
cluded from bringing suit as to any acts 
of negligence occurring within five years 
of filing their complaint. Id. 
Throughjones v. speed, 320 Md. 249, 
577 A.2d 64 (1990), the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland has clarified what 
constitutes a separate cause of action for 
negligence and thereby starts the accrual 
of Maryland's statute of limitations for 
medical malpractice. Where a physician 
repeatedly misdiagnoses his patient's 
condition due to negligence, each visit 
with the doctor may constitute a separ-
ate cause of action and thus, begin a new 
statute of limitations. 
- Michael P. CasEry 
In re Billman: DISPOSITION OF 
SUBSTITUTE ASSETS 
POSSESSED BY THIRD PARTY 
AND SUBJECT TO RICO 
FORFEITURE MAY BE ENJOINED 
In a case of first impression, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit ruled that it was within 
the power of the district court to enjoin 
the disposition of substitute assets pend-
ing criminal trial or forfeiture under 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Orga-
nizations laws (RICO). The court held 
that the statute, codified at 18 U.S.c. 
1963, prohibited a defendant from avoid-
ing forfeiture of his substitute assets. As 
a result, transfer of a RICO target's assets 
to a third person who did not qualify as a 
bona fide purchaser for value did not 
place the assets beyond the court's 
jurisdiction. u.s. v. McKinnEry, 915 F.2d 
916 (4th Cir. 1990). The Fourth Circuit 
determined that Congress intended Sec-
tion 1963 to be construed liberally in 
order to effectuate its remedial purpose. 
The purpose, in the context of McKin-
nEry, was to preserve the defendant's 
substitute assets for ultimate forfeiture 
upon conviction. 
Tom). Billman, implicated in the fail-
ure of a savings and loan, was indicted 
for racketeering, fraud, and conspiracy 
to commit mail and wire fraud. Before 
the indictment was issued, however, Bill-
man became a fugitive. After Billman's 
flight, Barbara A. McKinney, an alleged 
co-conspirator, received a number of 
cryptic telephone calls from Billman's 
London attorney and from Billman him-
self. The purpose of these conversations 
was to arrange a wire transfer of approx-
imately $500,000 from the attorney to 
McKinney. In addition, McKinney agreed 
to accept $50,000 from William C. 
McKnew in order to discharge a debt 
that McKnewowed to Billman. The debt 
was listed among Billman's assets. 
At the commencement of the action, 
the United States District Court for the 
District of Maryland entered a tempo-
rary restraining order (TRO) prohibit-
ing McKinney from disposing of the 
$550,000. McKinnEry, 915 F.2d at 919. 
The court subsequently held a hearing 
to determine the validity of the TRO, 
and to rule on a motion by the United 
States requesting an injunction restrain-
ing disposition of the funds pending the 
forfeiture proceedings. Id. 
The district court vacated the TRO 
and denied the government's motion for 
an injunction, reasoning that section 
1963 makes only those assets which the 
government proves are connected to 
the fugitive's alleged racketeering activ-
ity subject to pretrial restraint. Id. The 
court's decision was based on the govern-
ment's inability to trace $22,000,000 
deposited by the conspirators in Swiss 
bank accounts to the assets held by 
McKinney. Specifically, the lower court 
ruled that the government had failed to 
prove that the funds in question were 
actual RICO proceeds, and further de-
termined that after the wire transfer, the 
funds belonged to McKinney. Id. 
Believing that a more liberal reading 
of the statute was appropriate, the court 
of appeals held that an injunction should 
have been issued. Id. at 919-20. Com-
pelled to follow the lower court's find-
ings of fact the court treated the ques-
tioned funds as legitimate, despite its 
own opinion to the contrary. Id. at 920. 
Noting that under RICO the money was 
still subject to forfeiture as substitute 
assets, the court held that an injunction 
was proper against a third party who did 
not qualify as a bona fide purchaser for 
value. Thus, by determining that McKin-
ney was not a bona fide purchaser, the 
court held that the TRO was proper. Id. 
at 921. 
In its analysis of § 1963 (a)( 1) and 
(3), the court recognized that a forfei-
ture proceeding against funds derived 
from RICO criminal activity is "an in 
personam proceeding against the defen-
dant, and the forfeiture constitutes par-
tial punishment of the offense." McKin-
nEry, 915 F.2d at 920. 
Furthermore, amended section 1963 
( m ) provides for the forfeiture of substi-
tute assets when actual RICO proceeds 
are unavailable. Subsection (m) specifi-
cally provides that "[iJfanyofthe prop-
erty described in subsection (a), as a 
result of any act or omission of the 
defendant ... (3) has been placed be-
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